China’s Covid generation: the surging inequality behind Xi’s U-turn
In late September, Tashi, a student in a rural village of fewer than 100 people in south-eastern Tibet, returned to school after a six-week lockdown.
The 15-year-old’s grades had deteriorated markedly after weeks of trying to take classes on a smartphone with patchy internet in a crowded house while being cared for by ageing grandparents. His parents were 750km away in Lhasa, the capital, working.
“It was very difficult to concentrate during the lockdown. My three younger siblings were also taking classes in a noisy house,” he says, sitting next to baskets of dried fungi and herbal medicines, which are his village’s main trade.
She adds that there is also a sense of exhaustion among much of China’s middle class, dashing hopes of an economic recovery based on pent-up consumer demand.
“We’re going to enter a very long phase of stagnation of the Chinese economy. For me, that’s the biggest fear,” Yu says, adding that the resulting inequality appears to be “very Dickensian”.
Fu says that ultimately Xi’s zero-Covid policy has put on the line a fundamental pillar of the party’s legitimacy: the promise of a basic living standard for Chinese citizens.
“The party’s social contract with 1.4bn people is that it would provide for needs such as jobs, housing, food and security in exchange for popular support of its rule and acceptance of limitations on political rights,” she says. “To the extent that these basic social rights have been taken away during the pandemic, this poses a legitimacy dilemma for Beijing.”
This story originally appeared on: Financial Times - Author:Eleanor Olcott
